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I. The Booming Market in "Indianness"
As any New Age shaman - and many grave robbers - can tell you, Indians
are hot. As appreciation of traditional Native American cultures has grown over
the last few decades, so too has the market in objects and experiences thought
to express those cultures.' To the extent that it indicates respect for Native
American tribes and individuals and offers them a chance to profit in the market,
this development has been embraced. When a Paiute basket can sell for $25,675
and a Navajo serape for $107,375,2 opportunities for Native artists to make a
comfortable living exist.
1. See, e.g., Jim Adams, If Dealers Come Calling, Be Warned: Indian Art Market Is
Sizzling Hot, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Dec. 28, 2001, at DI; Brad Berton, Public Develops
Fetish for Fetishes, 16 L.A. Bus. J., May 9, 1994, at 1 (noting popularity of Zuni stone carvings
in trendy Venice, California). The downside of this popularity may be epitomized by Jack Lee
Harelson, who looted more than 2000 artifacts from Native American graves in Nevada and
Utah, then plotted to murder the detective and judge who helped convict him of the crimes.
Beth Quinn & Bryan Denson, Grave Robber Accused of Plotting to Kill Authorities,
OREGONIAN, Jan. 17, 2003, at Al.
2. Berton, supra note 1, at D1. Over ten years ago a Navajo men's wearing blanket was
estimated to be worth more than $1 million. Danielle A. Warnes, Law May Boost American
Indian Art, USA TODAY, May 16, 1991, at B4.
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Many Native Americans, however, view the continuing popularity of all
things "Indian" with more than a little skepticism.3 The problems cluster around
two distinct but related issues:
(1) Cheap imitation "Indian" crafts or services marketed by people who are
not native or, in many cases, even Americans undercut authentic tribal artists.4
(2) According to many Indian artists and leaders, sacred aspects of traditional
Indian cultures should not be sold commercially. Here the concern is not with
lost profit, but with lost meaning. It is a cultural harm rather than financial
harm.'
One scholar refers to these two sets of concerns as "realist" and
"traditionalist."6  The so-called "realists" acknowledge the tribes' partial
assimilation into the world market and seek to prosper within that system by
exploiting the niches carved for Indians by the dominant culture's laws and the
opportunities created by the free market. This group believes that the
circulation of cultural property is inevitable, so Indians may as well stake out as
much of the profits of such circulation as possible.7 The traditionalists,
meanwhile, are less concerned with money flowing in than with meaning
flowing out. They fear that commercial exploitation of traditional symbols,
3. The popularity or trendiness of "Indianness" can perhaps be seen not only in the desire
to have Indian products but to be (at least part) Indian. The 2000 census registered a doubling
since 1990 of people claiming to be part American Indian - Alaska Native. Census Figures
for 2000 Show a Large Rise in Native American Population (National Public Radio, All Things
Considered, March 26, 2001). In part this is a function of the census providing a new mixed-
race option for self-identification. But the huge increase also suggests, at least to some tribal
leaders, a large "wanna-be" factor. Id.
4. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Indians Complain of Religious and Cultural Theft, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1993, § 1, at 7 (reporting on Indian reaction against "appropriating Indian culture into
a kind of secular mysticism" divorced from any specific tribal significance); Nell Jessup
Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003
(1995) (discussing the desecration of Sioux culture by using the legendary leader's name to
market malt liquor); Angela Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual
Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 177 (2000)
(describing an indigenous group's loss of collective identity due to appropriation by outsiders
of its sacred tribal creation song).
6. Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1997). Farley discusses a grievous case in
Australia in which a rug manufacturer appropriated sacred aboriginal designs without
authorization or paying compensation. Id. at 4-7.
7. Id. at 14.
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images, stories and ceremonies may drain or dilute traditional cultural
resources.
8
These two perspectives, while not mutually exclusive, have led to
controversy within the Native American community. For instance, individuals
and tribes differ on whether the marketing of dream catchers is a legitimate
business or a craven prostitution of culture.9 The ubiquity of Kokopelli, the
Pueblo symbol of fertility and gaiety now seen on T-shirts, wind chimes and
refrigerator magnets,'" can be seen as a triumph of cultural tolerance and
exchange, or as a disastrous profanation of a sacred symbol. The domestication
and sale of the Kokopelli image "makes our stories and religion cute and naive,"
says Gloria Emerson (Navajo), executive director of the Center for Research and
Cultural Exchange at the Institute of American Indian Arts in Santa Fe.l"
The problem of expropriation of tribal meaning is global in scope, and
impacts all indigenous cultures.'2 New Age "shamans" around the world
construct their belief systems from images of American Indians. 3 Various
human rights organizations worldwide have recognized this problem of cultural
imperialism and recommended steps to combat it.'4 The Lakota, Nakota and
8. Id.
9. See Renee Ruble, Dream Catchers: Sacred or Sellers? American Indians Contemplate
Marketing of Culture, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 9, 2002, at B2.
10. Johnson, supra note 5, at 1.
11. Id.; cf. Mark Shaffer & Bill Donovan, Manufacturing of Fake Kachinas Offends Hopi,
NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Feb. 1994, at 6 (describing five doll factories in New Mexico
churning out hundreds of "kachinas" per year for one-fifth the price of authentic ones).
12. See, e.g., Emily D. Edwards, Firewalking: A Contemporary Ritual and Transformation,
DRAMA REV., Summer 1998, at 98 (discussing the "American firewalking movement"
appropriated from various indigenous societies including the holy men of Fiji); Farley, supra
note 6, at 4-7 (describing an Australian case involving appropriation of sacred aboriginal
designs).
13. See Simon Coleman, Book Review, 5 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 149, 149
(1999) (reviewing GALINA LINDQUIST, SHAMANIC PERFORMANCES ONTHE URBAN SCENE: NEO-
SHAMANISM IN CONTEMPORARY SWEDEN (1997)) ("[N]co-shamans mimetically construct their
culture out of images of the exotic Other - American Indian, Norse, and so on."); Christian F.
Feest, Europe's Indians, in THE INVENTED INDIAN: CULTURAL FICTIONS AND GOVERNMENT
POLICIES 320, 322-23 (James A. Clifton ed., 1990) (surveying the Continental history of
"Indian" con men, including an ersatz Iroquois received by Mussolini); Ward Churchill, Indians
Are Us?, in INDIANS ARE Us?: CULTURE AND GENOCIDE IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 207, 224-
25 (1994) (describing appropriation of "Indian" identity by Germans disenchanted with
European culture and its colonialist history); Gordon Bronitsky, Indians Find Doors Open
Across Pond, DENVER Bus. J., Oct. 17, 1997, at 46A ("In the summertime .... hundreds of
Germans assemble tepees by the river and pretend to be Indians.").
14. See, e.g., Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does
[Vol. 28
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Dakota Nations (popularly known collectively as the Sioux) have gone so far as
to declare war against spiritual poachers.'"
This article describes and assesses the responses to the proliferation of
"culture vultures," focusing on attempts to preserve the integrity of non-material
cultural resources - ceremonies, oral traditions, folklore - as well as their
material expressions in art and literature. I conclude that while present laws
provide sufficient protection for material objects intended for sale by the
"realist" group mentioned above, it fails to protect the interest of the
"traditional" group in preventing the erosion of tribal values due to the
marketing of "meaning." Because of their communal authorship and cumulative
development, ceremonies, songs and stories in oral traditions cannot be
protected by current intellectual property laws. While new federal intellectual
property law tailored to Native American oral traditions could fill this gap, the
dangers of such a law outweigh its possible benefits. Heavy-handed federal
legislation might well destroy - or at least devalue - the very resources it
seeks to preserve. Instead, tribes must protect intangible cultural property by
inventorying and asserting control over it through tribal laws, policies and
treaties.
Part II details the theoretical basis of this analysis, discussing the process of
commodification of cultural heritage and the damage such a process can wreak.
Part III looks at laws currently protecting native cultural resources, including
intellectual property laws and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA), 16
concluding that these laws are inadequate to the task. Part IV considers various
potential sources of additional protection, based on communal rights
acknowledged in federal Indian laws. Rather than being the property of an
individual entitled to the exclusive profit from the work, the song or story would
be considered communal property of the tribe, which would control rights to use
and alienation. Part V, however, concludes that such a federal Indian
intellectual property rights regime, by encouraging the conceptualization of
cultural resources as commodities, would augment rather than stem the draining
of meaning from those resources.
the Unidroit Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the Unesco
Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469 (1994); Farley, supra note 6, at 12-13.
15. Declaration of War Against Exploiters of Lakota Spirituality, Ratified by the Dakota,
Lakota and Nakota Nations (June 1993), reprinted in Churchill, supra note 13, at 273-77.
16. 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-305e (2000).
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II. To Market or Not to Market?: Conflicting Uses of Cultural Resources
A. What Are Cultural Resources?
This article defines cultural resources broadly to include all resources for the
creation and evolution of a group's distinctive cultural identity: language, songs,
creation stories and other oral traditions both sacred and secular, as well as the
material objects created in ceremonial or artistic activities. Although these
resources are often referred to as cultural property,7 because of the dangers of
propertization (to be discussed in section V) the term cultural resources will be
used.
Traditional definitions of cultural property limit the term to material objects
expressing the culture of a certain defined group of people.18 The major statutes
protecting Native American cultural resources adopt this exclusively
materialistic orientation. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act
(ARPA)19 protects material remains of human life and activities that are at least
100 years old.2" The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA)2' prohibits sale or purchase of Native American human remains or
cultural items acquired without proper authority, and requires repatriation of
such items to the culturally affiliated tribe.22 In addition to human remains,
NAGPRA sets forth a list of protected items: funerary objects (those associated
with a death rite or ceremony), sacred objects (those used in traditional or
present-day ceremonies), and cultural patrimony ("an object having ongoing
historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American
17. See, e.g., Suzan Shown Harjo, An Approach to New Law to Protect Cultural Property
Rights, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 20, 2002, at A5; Farley supra note 6, at 1.
18. See, e.g., Antonia M. De Meo, More Effective Protectionfor Native American Cultural
Property Through Regulation of Export, 19 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994) (defining cultural
property as including "a variety of objects[:] ... baskets, pottery, masks, tapestries, sculptures,
or engravings"); Francis P. McManamon, What Are Heritage Resources and Why Are They
Protected?, in HERITAGERESOURCESLAW 1 (Sherry Huttet al. eds., 1999) ("heritage resources"
or "cultural resources" include "archaeological sites, historic structures, museum objects,
historic shipwrecks, and traditional cultural places").
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (2000).
20. Id. § 470bb(1). Under ARPA, archaeological resources include "pottery, basketry,
bottles, weapons, weapon projectiles, tools, structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock
paintings, rock carvings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials, or any portion or piece of
the foregoing items." Id
21. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000).
22. Id. § 3005.
[Vol. 28
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group or culture").2 3 ARPA and NAGPRA, with their retrospective focus on
preserving sacred materials from the past, extend no protection to non-material
cultural resources such as stories or ceremonies.24
A similar approach is taken by those who distinguish cultural property -
historical, archaeological, and ethnographical objects - from intellectual
property - inventions or products designed to be marketed for sale. 5 Beyond
its problematic attempt to sever intellect from culture (and perhaps to elevate
intellect over culture),26 this distinction suffers from a more concrete problem:
in the context of Native cultures, it can be difficult to distinguish between the
tWO. 27 Moreover, relegation of intangible cultural property to the protection of
Western intellectual property law may be ineffective, since that law was
designed to help individual authors profit, not to help collective cultures survive
and develop.28
B. The Importance of Intangible Cultural Property: Stories in Native
American Cultures
The power and importance of oral traditions in Native American cultures
cannot be overstated. The creative power of the spoken word is a central theme
both in creation stories from tribal oral traditions and in contemporary written
Native American literatures.29 In the Navajo tradition, gods sang and prayed this
world into existence during a sweathouse ritual.3°
23. Id. § 3001(3).
24. Such non-material resources may find some protection in traditional intellectual
property laws - patent, trademark, and copyright - as well as in specially tailored legislation
such as IACA. See infra Part lI.E (assessing the adequacy of such laws to protect Native
cultural property).
25. See Richard A. Guest, intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes, 20 AM.
INDIANL. REv. 111, 115-16 (1995-96) (noting the difference between NAGPRA's policy of
protecting the past and IACA's policy of protecting future profits).
26. The Romantic notion of the author as individual genius breaking free from culture and
tradition to introduce, in Wordsworth's famous phrase, "a new element into the intellectual
universe" continues to be a dominant cultural belief, despite persistent scholarly attempts to
demonstrate such a paradigm is a limited historical construct rather than a "natural" account of
creativity. See Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279 (1992); Riley, supra note 5, at 182-84 ("Deconstructing the
Romantic Author").
27. See infra Part H.C ("The Dream Catcher Syndrome").
28. See infra Part II1.E.
29. A. LAVONNE BROWN RUOFF, AMERICAN INDIAN LITERATURES: 6-7 (1990).
30. GARY WITHERSPOON, LANGUAGE AND ART IN THE NAVAJO UNIVERSE 16(1977).
No. 1]
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The earth will be, from the very
beginning I have thought it.
The mountains will be, from the very beginning I have thought it.
(and so on)
The earth will be, from ancient times
I speak it.
The mountains will be, from ancient times
I speak it.
(and so on)3'
Similarly, in Leslie Silko's acclaimed novel Ceremony, the contemporary
narrative is woven together with descriptions of the traditional Laguna Pueblo
creator, Thought-Woman, calling things into existence as she names them, and
bringing events to pass as she tells their story.32 Scott Momaday captured the
essential insight:
that in a certain sense we are all made of words, that our most
essential being consists in language. It is the element in which we
think and dream and act, in which we live our daily lives. There is
no way in which we can exist apart from the morality of a verbal
dimension.33
Although this insight may be especially crucial in oral cultures, students of
Christianity will no doubt recall the opening of the Apostle John's creation
narrative: "In the beginning was the Word."' The primacy and centrality of
language, and in particular the spoken word, seems to be a cross-cultural insight.
Compounding this importance is the fact that so much of traditional tribal
knowledge and linguistic art is contained within oral traditions rather than
written works. 5 Oral traditions are not merely intangible museums for storing
31. Id. (translating the Navajo "Beginning of the World Song").
32. LESLIE MARMON SILKO, CEREMONY 1 (Penguin 1986) (1977).
33. N. Scott Momaday, The Man Made of Words, in THE REMEMBERED EARTH 162, 162
(Geary Hobson ed., 1981) (1979).
34. John 1:1 (King James). For a funny yet telling "sermon" on this Gospel text by an
urban Kiowa trickster-preacher, see N. ScOrr MOMADAY, HOUSE MADE OF DAWN 89-98
(Perennial Library 1989) (1968). In Momaday's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, the Reverend
John Big Bluff Tossamah concedes that John (the Apostle) made a good start in his gospel, but
being a white man went on to say too much, as whites always do. White culture's endless
proliferation of language, notably in advertising and political speechifying, has diluted the
power of language, in oral performance, to bring the hearer into the direct presence of the
speaker's mind and spirit. Id. at 95.
35. LAURA COLTELLI, WINGED WORDS: AMERICAN INDIAN WRITERS SPEAK 104 (1990)
[Vol. 28
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outdated, static verbal "treasures"; rather, they are living, evolving bodies of
what is sometimes called "esoteric knowledge" - knowledge about the physical
and spiritual components of the world and how to live in harmony with that
world.36 Esoteric knowledge, in turn, is more than an assemblage of discrete
segments of information; collectively it comprises a group's distinct cultural
identity. Stories, songs, and ceremonies are at least as important as material
artifacts in nurturing and maintaining this sense of self. A people is without
identity until it has imagined itself one and has given that imagined identity form
through the art of storytelling.37
Like their material counterparts, intangible cultural resources have been
subjected to expropriation by outsiders both for commercial and scientific
purposes. Commercial exploitation of tribal traditions by "plastic shamans" has
been widely documented and condemned.3" These spiritual pot hunters, as they
might be called, not only debase cultural traditions by prostituting them, but may
also misrepresent those traditions to the consuming public.39 Less appreciated,
perhaps, is the damage that may be caused by even the most well-meaning
efforts of scientific collectors of culture. Beginning in the late nineteenth
century, scientific treasure hunters began extensive operations in "salvage
anthropology." Operating under the assumption that the laws of social
(interview by Laura Coltelli with Simon Ortiz).
36. James D. Nason, Traditional Property and Modem Laws: The Need for Native
American Community Intellectual Property Rights Legislation, 12 STAN. L. & POL' YREv. 255,
259 (2001).
37. See generally Momaday, supra note 33. The importance of storytelling in the creation
and evolution of Native identities is a recurring theme in contemporary Native literature and
criticism. See JACE WEAVER, OTHER WORDS: AMERICAN INDIAN LITERATURE, LAW, AND
CULTURE 45-48 (2001) (quoting several prominent Native authors on the central role of
storytelling in creating and sustaining tribal communities).
38. See, e.g., Alice B. Kehoe, Primal Gaia: Primitivists and Plastic Medicine Men, in THE
INVENTED INDIAN 194 (James A. Clifton ed. 1990); Ward Churchill, Spiritual Hucksterism: The
Rise of the Plastic Medicine Men, in FANTASIES OFTHE MASTER RACE 215 (1992).
39. For example, a self-proclaimed Northern Cheyenne artist and "shaman" named Nathan
Cagle, who allegedly charged $300 for sweat lodge ceremonies and $600 for "vision quests,"
recently was revealed as a sham and convicted of grand theft, theft by false pretenses and other
crimes for defrauding his art dealer girlfriend. James May, Man Claiming to Be Northern
Cheyenne "Shaman" Convicted on Eight Felony Counts, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Feb. 20,
2002, at B 1. In addition to his mercenary transgressions, Cagle also contributed to the vast pool
of misinformation about Native spirituality by lecturing on Northern Cheyenne traditions at
local elementary schools and to scouting troops. Id.
40. Brian Swam, Introduction, to COMING TO LIGHT: CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATIONS OF
THE NATIVE LITERATURES OF NORTH AMERICA xiii, xxix (Swam ed., 1994).
No. 1]
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progress made Indians, as distinct cultures, the "Vanishing Americans,"'4
ethnographers combed Indian country for stories and prayers as well as
artifacts.42 Regardless of whether one views this activity as a laudable rescue
operation or an exercise in cultural imperialism,43 it seems undeniable that the
wholesale "collection" of culture was premised on the notion of making
available for public education and appreciation much material that was never
meant to be made public." To the extent that this scientific-educational project
succeeded, it spurred public interest in ethnic art both in the United States and
abroad, fueling in turn an art market that encouraged widespread looting of
cultural property. 5 Thus craven commercial exploitation and scientific
"salvage" both contributed to the same dynamic of cultural dispossession. In
each case, cultural resources, whether tangible or intangible, were torn from
their living roots and became commodities.
C. Commodification of Cultural Resources: The Dream Catcher Syndrome
It may not be immediately apparent why commodification of cultural
resources, in itself, presents a problem for Native cultures. Unauthorized
appropriation of stories or artworks, whether for scientific or commercial
41. See generally BRIAN DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATITUDES AND U.S.
INDIAN POLICY (1982). A typical expression of this attitude, and the "salvage" anthropology
it spawned, is the following from 1884:
European culture is engulfing and destroying the native peoples left in the
world. Their customs and habits, legends and memories, weapons and artifacts are
rapidly disappearing ....
-Mankind must therefore make every effort to collect, as the most valuable
knowledge of the ancient past, all the objects pertaining to the development of
culture .... By rights the ethnological museums are the ones that should send
collectors out to answer this call and salvage what can still be saved.
Adrian Woldt, Translater's Preface to JOHAN A. JACOBSEN, ALASKAN VOYAGE, 1881-1883: AN
EXPEDITION TO THE NORTHWEST COAST OF AMERICA (Erna Gunther trans., 1977).
42. Swam, supra note 40, at xxix.
43. See Ward Churchill, The New Racism: A Critique of James A. Clifton's The Invented
Indian, in FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE 163, 165 (1992) (arguing that even Clifton, a
respected contemporary anthropologist, exploits "the Indian business" for professional gain as
he tries to debunk racist traditions in his field); cf. Lenora Ledwon, Native American Life Stories
and "Authorship ": Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 69,69 (1996) (asking "how
does a non-Native collaborator avoid a colonizing relationship to Native American texts?").
44. Leslie Marmon Silko, An Old-Time Indian Attack Conducted in Two Parts, SHANTIH,
Summer-Fall 1979, at 2, 3 (criticizing "the racist assumption still abounding, is that the prayers,
chants, and stories weaseled out by the early white ethnographers," [which are now] "collected
in ethnographic journals, are public property").
45. Nason, supra note 36, at 256-57.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/8
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purposes, clearly exploits those cultures and must be condemned.' But this
could be seen simply as a problem of who controls the commodity rather than
commodification itself. Correcting the "market" in cultural resources by
restoring control of the "goods" to their "producers" would, in this view, solve
the problem.47 Native "owners" would then have the right to exclude others
from the resources, or alienate those resources if the price (or other
consideration) rose high enough, thereby maximizing their value." This so-
called "law and economics" approach would emphasize enforcement of
traditional intellectual property law as well as specially tailored legislation like
NAGPRA and IACA.49
In the context of goods produced for sale, this approach works well.
However, it assumes the commensurability of all values on the same -
ultimately mathematical and monetary - scale.50 In order to be compared for
purposes of exchange, all values must be reduced to cash sums.5" While this
scheme possesses an attractive simplicity, it ignores (or seeks to change) the
46. Suzan Harjo, Native Peoples' Cultural and Human Rights: An UnfinishedAgenda, 24
ARiz. ST. L.J. 321, 328 (1992) (characterizing "this time of increased appropriation of Native
national names, religious symbology, and cultural images").
47. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAw 31-35 (4th ed., 1992) (arguing
that if all things valuable could be reduced to property, and markets function properly, total
collective value would be maximized).
48. See id. In Posner's influential exposition of the "law and economics" paradigm,
optimal market functioning depends on three conditions: universality, exclusivity and
transferability.
[I]f every valuable (meaning scarce as well as desired) resource were owned by
someone (the criterion of universality), ownership connoted the unqualified power
to exclude everybody else from using the resource (exclusivity) as well as to use
it oneself, and if ownership rights were freely transferable, or as lawyers say
alienable (transferability), value would be maximized.
Id. at 34.
49. See, e.g., Guest, supra note 25, at 136-39 (arguing for aggressive enforcement of IACA
to protect Native American intellectual property).
50. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODnTES 8-12 (1996).
51. Id. at 8. Karl Marx long ago noted this propensity of the capitalist market to erase
qualitative differences, or "dissolve [them] in the cash nexus," promoting transferability yet
ultimately dehumanizing workers who came to view their own creative capacities as
commodities for sale. Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in THE MARX-ENGELs READER 105,
115 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978) (1846). But as Radin and others have made clear, one does
not have to denounce capitalism in general to insist that some values - like some rights - are
inalienable. RADIN, supra note 50, at 16-29; cf. Wendy J. Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On
Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 136-39 (1998) (exploring possible
limits of the legal trend toward increased propertization of intellectual property).
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broad social consensus that some rights or "properties" - among them life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness - are inalienable, and thus cannot be
measured on a scale of transferability. 2
Many Native cultural resources fall into this category of market-
inalienability.53 Only an imposter would sell a sweat lodge ceremony
"experience" for $3 00 ;' actual spiritual leaders insist that sacred stories, images
and ceremonies are not to be sold. 5 In fact it is precisely this inalienability and
nonfungibility, this resistance to assimilation into a single world "market of
ideas," that enables cultural resources to define a distinct cultural identity. 6
When songs or designs are sold - or stolen and repackaged - as commodities,
they become decontextualized, their meaning drained, and their value to the
Native culture eroded.57 Tensions may arise, however, when cultural resources
are not appropriated by outsiders, but voluntarily offered for sale by Native
artisans or business people. The issue then becomes where to draw the line
between secular individual resources and those that are sacred, and hence
inalienable.
52. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
53. The term "market-inalienability" is Radin's. See RADIN, supra note 50, at 18.
54. See May, supra note 39 at B I (reporting on the sham Cheyenne "shaman" Nathan
Cagle).
55. One expert, testifying in a United Nations report, made the point in especially eloquent
and relevant terms:
[A] song, for example, is not a "commodity," a "good," or a form of "property,"
but one of the manifestations of an ancient and continuing relationship between
the people and their territory. Because it is an expression of a continuing
relationship between the particular people and their territory, moreover, it is
inconceivable that a song, or any other element of the people's collective identity,
could be alienated permanently or completely.... [Indigenous peoples do not
view their heritage in terms of property at all - that is, something which has an
owner and is used for the purpose of extracting economic benefits - but in terms
of community and individual responsibility .... For indigenous peoples, heritage
is a bundle of relationships, rather than a bundle of economic rights.
Farley, supra note 6, at 14-15 n.52 (quoting Erica-Irene Daes, Study on the Protection of the
Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Item 14
of Provisional Agenda, at 7, U.N. Doc. EICN.41Sub.2/1993128 (1993)).
56. See RADIN, supra note 50, at 165-69 (critiquing the notion of a laissez-faire marketplace
promoting "free trade in ideas").
57. See Farley, supra note 6, at 10-11 (discussing designs of Australian Aborigines); Riley,
supra note 5, at 175-79 (describing exploitation by German rock group of the sacred Song of
Joy of the Ami, Talwan's largest indigenous tribe).
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This line can be hard to draw, as controversy over the dream catcher
suggests.58 Dream catchers are net or web-like structures that, in the traditions
of many tribes, are to be hung above a baby's cradle. The net catches and traps
nightmares, but allows good dreams to pass through.59 For the Ojibwe
(Anishinaabe), the dream catcher is a sacred item to be made in a series of
ceremonial steps.' Now, however, much like Kokopelli,6" the dream catcher is
being mass produced for sale as earrings, key chains and the like.62 Because of
this commodification, some Ojibwe feel the dream catcher has "lost a lot of
meaning, even in our own tribe."63 However, the owner of the tribe's gift shop
sells dream catchers without compunction. "If people like and enjoy having
Indian crafts, I feel great."64 Where some tribal members see an opportunity
both to make money and promote appreciation of tribal culture, others feel a
hemorrhaging of cultural meaning. The former viewpoint has been
characterized as realist; the latter as traditional.65 Any scheme to protect cultural
resources must accommodate both perspectives, negotiating the inherent tension
between the two. The following survey of existing protections for cultural
resources tells the story of a slow, and as yet incomplete, movement toward
accommodation of the traditionalists' resistance to commodification.
III. Existing Protections for Cultural Resources: Problems and Potential
The evolution of American laws protecting cultural heritage resources reflects
a series of responses to different interests and perceived threats. In the
chronological survey that follows, it will become clear that, in recent years,
these laws have become much more responsive to and protective of Native
American concerns.' Even so, more legal protection may be needed,
particularly of intangible cultural resources a group may wish to designate as
market-inalienable because those resources are sacred or central to communal
identity.67 But even to consider such laws as protecting a living, evolving tribal
58. Dream Catchers: Sacred or Sellers? American Indians Contemplate Marketing of
Culture, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 9, 2002, at B2 [hereinafter Dream Catchers].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
62. Dream Catchers, supra note 58, at B2.
63. Id. (quoting Gerald White).
64. Id. (quoting Ruth Garbow).
65. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
66. See infra Part Ill.C-D.
67. See infra Part IV (discussing the legal bases for such additional protection).
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heritage rather than relics of an extinct race shows a dramatic reorientation from
the humble beginnings of cultural resource protection law.
A. The Antiquities Act of 1906
The late nineteenth century, with the end of the Indian wars and the
expansion of the railroads, ushered in the Golden Age of pot hunting in the
West.68 A widespread concern that vandals and looters were depriving the
public of valuable archaeological resources prompted Congress, on June 8,
1906, to pass the Antiquities Act.69 In addition to authorizing the President to
designate national monuments,7° the Act establishes a permit system for "the
gathering of objects of antiquity" on federal lands,7' and establishes criminal
penalties for persons who destroy or appropriate such objects from federal land
without permission.72 Permits are to be granted only to those "properly
qualified" to excavate and collect antiquities, presumably persons affiliated with
"recognized scientific or educational institutions" where the artifacts are to be
deposited.73 The goal is "to increas[e] the knowledge of such objects" and to
provide for their "permanent preservation in public museums. 74
The Antiquities Act asserted ownership and control by the federal
government of cultural resources located on federal land. In the name of a
generalized national heritage, the Act aimed to exclude private plunderers and
bring the resources into the public domain for educational and scholarly
purposes. The original owners, whether individual Native Americans or tribes,
were presumed to have vanished, consigned to the realm of "antiquity."75 Even
68. HUTr ETAL., supra note 18, at 182; POLLY MILLER, LOST HERITAGE OFALASKA: THE
ADVENTURE AND ART OFTHE ALASKAN COASTALINDIANS 237 (1967) (arguing that the "massive
exodus" of native art "not only disrupted cultural patterns responsible for the creation of the
arts, it began to clean out the native inventory as well.").
69. Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433
(2000)). For a detailed history of the Antiquities Act, see RONALD F. LEE, THE ANTIQUITIES
ACT OF 1906 (1970).
70. Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
71. Id. § 432.
72. Id. § 433. The criminal penalty provision was pronounced void for vagueness by the
Ninth Circuit when the "objects of antiquity" the defendant was charged with appropriating
were San Carlos Apache masks used in ceremonies of ancient origin but the masks themselves
were only three or four years old. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 432.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing image of the
Indian as "Vanishing American").
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so, the Antiquities Act represents an important first step on the path to cultural
resource protection.
B. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979
By the 1970s it had become clear that the Antiquities Act was toothless. Not
only was its $500 fine woefully inadequate to deter looters given the potential
profits to be made in the international art market,76 the criminal provisions of the
Act had been held void for vagueness by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals."
Finding that archaeological resources continued to bleed into the hands of
private plunderers, Congress in 1979 passed the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act (ARPA).7"
Like the Antiquities Act, ARPA protects archeologists more than the cultures
they study. Like its predecessor, ARPA asserts federal ownership and control
of archaeological resources on "public lands" (including Indian lands);79
resources excavated and removed pursuant to a permit "remain the property of
the United States."'8 In issuing permits, federal land managers must make sure
the applicant is "qualified" (i.e. a professional archeologist rather than a pot-
hunting desert rat) and is "furthering archaeological knowledge in the public
interest.""1 The interests to be protected are those of the archaeologists and the
public, not the tribes.8 2  Much like "antiquities," resources deemed
"archaeological" are presumed to have passed from individual or tribal
ownership into federal ownership, in trust for the public.
ARPA's relatively stiff penalty provisions may help discourage private
looting of native heritage resources.8 3 Another improvement on the Antiquities
76. HUTr ETAL., supra note 18, at 188-89.
77. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (2000). ARPA largely supercedes the Antiquities Act with
respect to the permit program. See Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
470cc(h)(1) ("No permit or other permission shall be required under the [Antiquities Act] for
any activity for which a permit is issued under this section.").
79. Id. § 470bb(3)-(4) (defining "public lands" and "Indian lands").
80. Id. § 470cc(b)(3). "Archaeological resource" is defined broadly to include virtually any
material evidence of human habitation or activity, provided the artifact is at least 100 years old.
Id. § 470bb(1); cf. 43 C.F.R. § 7.3(a)(1) (2001) ("'of archaeological interest' means capable of
providing scientific or humanistic understandings of past human behavior, cultural adaptation,
and related topics through the application of scientific or scholarly techniques .....
81. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(1)-(2).
82. Id.
83. Violators may be fined up to $10,000 and imprisoned for up to a year. If the value of
the resources involved and the cost of restoration and repair exceeds the relatively paltry sum
of $500, those penalties may increase to $20,000 and two years imprisonment. Subsequent
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Act is ARPA's requirement to provide notice to Indian tribes if the permitted
activity may damage religious or cultural sites." Moreover, permits involving
resources located on Indian lands may be granted only with the consent of the
individual or tribe owning the land.85 But title to the artifacts collected under
ARPA permits remains with the United States;86 ARPA contains no repatriation
provision. The Act apparently did help spur some voluntary repatriations,
however, foreshadowing and paving the way for NAGPRA.s7
C. The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990
Building on the impetus of ARPA, and other legislation protecting Native
American cultural heritage resources such as the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (1978),88 Congress passed NAGPRA in 1990.89 NAGPRA
represents a dramatic shift in orientation toward Native American cultural
heritage resources by recognizing Indian nations' property rights - and human
rights - in Native remains and certain objects of cultural importance. 9' In
contrast to the earlier archaeological acts, NAGPRA asserts Native American
tribes and individuals, not the federal government, own Indian human remains
and cultural items.9' Procedurally, the Act requires institutions receiving federal
funds to inventory their collections of human remains and, in consultation with
tribes, determine the cultural affiliation of those remains and associated funerary
convictions may carry fines of up to $100,000 and five years in prison. Id. § 470ee(d). The
Criminal Fines Improvement Act of 1987 increased the maximum fine under ARPA to $100,000
for a misdemeanor and $250,000 for a felony. Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (2000). As long as the notice is given, presumably the damage
may proceed.
85. Id. § 470cc(g)(2).
86. Id. § 470cc(b)(3).
87. Jane Gross, Stanford Agrees to Return Ancient Bones to Indians, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1989, at I (describing the University's agreement to return the remains of 550 Ohlone Indians
for reburial); Patrick Sweeney, Indians Win Battle to BuryAncestors, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
DISPATCH, July 16, 1989, at IB (describing the University of Minnesota's agreement to
repatriate the bones and skulls of approximately 1000 Indians previously excavated from burial
mounds).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
89. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013
(2000)).
90. Sherry Hutt & Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as Human Rights Law,
31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 363, 364 (1999).
91. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2000).
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objects found with them.92 Once cultural affiliation is determined, the process
of repatriation - returning the remains or objects to their rightful owner(s) -
must begin.93 This explicit statutory recognition of Native American human and
property rights "brings to an end the domination of Eurocentric assumptions
concerning property rights and the disparate treatment of human remains. '
While a detailed discussion of NAGPRA95 is beyond the scope of this article,
it should be noted that the Act not only acknowledges Native American rights
to cultural heritage resources but also that some of these rights may be
inalienable. One of the categories of items subject to NAGPRA is "cultural
patrimony," defined in the statute as
an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural
importance central to the Native American group or culture itself,
rather than property owned by an individual Native American, and
which, therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by
any individual regardless of whether or not the individual is a
member of the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and
such object shall have been considered inalienable by such native
American group at the time the object was separated from such
group.
96
As will be discussed in Part IV, this acknowledgment of a communal right to
certain resources central to Native American culture provides one legal toehold
for constructing a protective scheme not predicated entirely on Western
intellectual property's emphasis on individual creativity and ownership.97
92. Id. § 3003.
93. Id. § 3005.
94. Hutt & McKeown, supra note 90, at 367.
95. See generally Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35
(1992); Leonard D. Duboff, 500 Years After Columbus: Protecting Native American Culture,
11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43, 49-52 (1992) (describing the Act and noting some
ambiguities in the definitions of categories of "cultural items"); HUTT ET AL., supra note 18, at
316-352; Renee M. Kosslak, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: The
Death Knellfor Scientific Study, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129 (2000) (exploring troubling aspects
of NAGPRA from a scientific perspective); Nason, supra note 36, at 258-59.
96. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D). The Tenth Circuit has rejected the argument that the statute's
definition of "cultural patrimony" is unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Corrow, 119
F.3d 796, 804 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming a criminal conviction for trafficking in eagle and owl
feathers).
97. See Riley, supra note 5, at 213 (noting NAGPRA's recognition of "indigenous
communal property - that which is created by a group for long-term use within the community
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
Nearly as important as NAGPRA's ownership provision is its provision that
the culturally affiliated tribe itself determines which resources are "sacred
objects" and "cultural patrimony."98 By requiring an ongoing dialogue between
tribes and the museums and government agencies holding cultural objects,
NAGPRA ensures that the culture of origin is not just a passive recipient of
discrete objects, but a continual participant in defining the meaning of those
objects.
Tribal determination of which resources are inalienable cultural patrimony
may be crucial to a tribe's economic as well as spiritual well being. Designating
too much of culture as "sacred" and thus inalienable would not only stifle
commerce but could distort tribal cultures.' Whereas ARPA and NAGPRA
restrict commerce in certain Native American artifacts," the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act addresses the related problem of controlling tribal intellectual
property for profit.
D. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990
The original Indian Arts and Crafts Act was passed in 1935 as part of
President Roosevelt's "Indian New Deal."'O° The Act authorizes the Indian Arts
and Crafts Board"° to undertake various activities designed "to promote the
economic welfare of the Indian tribes and Indian individuals through the
development of Indian arts and crafts and the expansion of the market for the
products of Indian art and craftsmanship."0 3 The amendments of 1990 extended
and whose value is not fully materialized unless the property is available to the group as a
whole.").
98. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C)-(D) (2000); Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native
American Cultural Property, 72 INDIANA L.J. 723,726 (1997) ("NAGPRA in effect substitutes
tribal property institutions for Anglo-American property institutions.").
99. See Richard White, All Roads Are Good: Native Voices on Life and Culture, NEW
REPuBLIC, Apr. 21, 1997, at 33 (warning of a romanticist trend, among both whites and Indians,
"particularly among urban Indians, to define more and more of Indian life as sacred.").
100. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (2000) (prohibiting trafficking in objects unlawfully obtained);
United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming conviction under ARPA
where defendant transported in interstate commerce burial mound artifacts obtained in violation
of Indiana state laws of trespass and conversion); 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b) (2000) (providing
criminal sanctions for anyone who "knowingly sells, purchases, uses for profit or transports for
sale or profit any Native American cultural items obtained in violation of [NAGPRA].").
101. GAIL K. SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN: THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFrS ACT OF
1990, at 16 (1997).
102. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
103. Id. § 305a.
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the scope of the Act by expanding the Board's enforcement powers,'°4
authorizing civil actions against merchants who misrepresent goods as
"Indian,' ' 10 5 defining key terms of the Act such as "Indian, ''1°" and granting the
Board authority to assign "trademarks of genuineness and quality" to Indian
products. '07
On its face, IACA seems a straightforward law promoting economic welfare
rather than protecting cultural heritage resources. The central idea is to protect
market share, not tribal identity, through preventing the flooding of the market
with fake products.108 To this extent, IACA is, as the Board itself once declared,
simply an Indian "truth-in-advertising" law protecting consumers as well as
Indian artisans."°9 However, a close reading of the legislative history of IACA
leads at least one commentator to conclude the Act was nothing less than "an
effort to save Indian culture itself."" 0 The economic and cultural aims converge
in the Act's delegation to Native institutions and individuals the power to define
what goods are authentic "Indian" products.1" In addition to the Board's power
to certify the "genuineness and quality" of the work of individuals, tribes, or arts
and crafts organizations, tribes play a key role in determining authenticity
because the Act defines "Indian" as one who is either a member of a tribe or
certified as an Indian artisan by a tribe." 2 Cultural authenticity, perhaps oddly,
depends on political affiliation; a dream catcher made by an enrolled Ojibwe
artist would be an "Indian product" under the Act,"3 while the dream catcher of
104. Id. § 305d.
105. Id. § 305e(a)-(c).
106. Id. § 305e(d). In October 2000 Congress passed the Indian Arts and Crafts
Enforcement Act of 2000, which made some minor technical changes to the law. Pub. L. No.
106-497, 114 Stat. 2219 (2000).
107. Id. § 305a.
108. A U.S. Department of Commerce report in 1985 estimated annual sales of Native
American jewelry and handicrafts at $400 to $800 million. However, fake products sold at
cutthroat prices accounted for up to 20% of that figure. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STUDY OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES CONCERNING IMPORTED NATIVE
AMERICAN-STYLE JEWELRY AND HANDICRAFTS (1985).
109. William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts
and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1009, 1027 (2001) (citing INDIAN ARTS & CRAFTS
BD., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, MISREPRESENTATION (1999)).
110. Id. at 1028.
111. Id.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(d)(1).
113. Id. § 305e(d)(2). This example is not far-fetched. Jimmie Durham, an artist whose
work hangs in the permanent collection of the Vatican, is of Cherokee descent but not enrolled
in the tribe. When he sought certification, the Cherokees denied it. On the other hand, Jeanne
Walker Rorex, another prominent artist of Cherokee descent, refuses to seek enrollment or
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his unenrolled grandmother (barring certification) would not. If the
grandmother offered her dreamcatcher for sale, she would be in violation of
IACA and subject to a civil action or criminal prosecution.
IACA thus may be seen to create a kind of property right in "authentic"
Indian identity."' By granting the right to define this identity/property and
exclude others from it, IACA provides federally recognized tribes and members
of those tribes important economic and cultural protection. As the example
above suggests, however, this power may be asserted arbitrarily to exclude
individuals who may be thoroughly steeped in a tribal tradition yet not meet the
Act's political definition of "Indian." Such an outcome may be unwise from a
social standpoint, and may even violate the Fifth Amendment as a deprivation
of property (Indian identity) without due process of law." 5 At the very least,
IACA's attempt to certify "genuineness" of artistic goods is problematic." 6
Thus it is not surprising that estimates of IACA's probable effectiveness have
varied wildly. 7 Many commentators agree, however, that some legal protection
regime sensitive to the unique nature of some Native cultural resources is
necessary, because traditional intellectual property law does not adequately
protect those resources." 8
E. Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Laws
As discussed above, NAGPRA and ARPA provide important protections for
tangible items of cultural property, but do not reach intangible resources such
as stories or ceremonies. The focus of IACA, similarly, is on concrete items,
although in this case goods for sale."9 But this is not to say intangible cultural
certification, seeing the issue as individual autonomy. Hapiuk, supra note 109, at 1034-35.
114. SHEFFIELD, supra note 101, at 138-41.
115. Id. at 138; U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
116. 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2000) (authorizing the Board to assign "trademarks of genuineness
and quality"); Hapiuk, supra note 109, at 1029-31 (by equating "genuineness" of the product
with the "Indianness" of the producer, IACA "grossly oversimplifies the 'genuineness' issue.").
117. Compare Duboff, supra note 95, at 57 (dismissing IACA as a"paper tiger") with Guest,
supra note 25, at 136-39 (advocating vigorous enforcement of IACA as the best means of
protecting tribal intellectual property).
118. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 5, at 214-18.
119. Richard Guest argues that, since IACA does not define "Indian products," giving it only
"the meaning given such term in regulations which may be promulgated by the Secretary of the
Interior," 25 U.S.C. 305e(d)(2) (2000), and since no such regulations have been promulgated,
it may be possible to convince a court that the term extends beyond the arts and crafts arena to
include seeds, stories and other cultural property. Guest, supra note 25, at 136. But this would
only protect the property owner from unfair competition from fakes; it would not help a
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resources lack protection altogether. Like any other persons, Native Americans
can and do use patent, trademark, and copyright laws to protect their intellectual
property.' 20 Intellectual property law regulates the relationships between holders
of rights in non-physical objects - designs, symbols, original expressions of
ideas, etc. "[I]ntellectual property is not really property at all; the things that we
call intellectual property are really rights to do certain things, to authorize others
to do certain things, and to prevent others from doing certain things."' 2' The
problem for Native Americans in asserting these rights is that often either the
holder of the right or the property itself is not recognized by Western law.
22
The Western focus on the lone originator, the free agent, the creative genius
123
often conflicts with the more communal focus of native peoples, in which
identity and rights derive from membership in clan, kinship and tribal
networks. 124 Western intellectual property law works well in protecting Native
creations it recognizes as valid, but, as the following brief survey shows, falls
short when those creations fall outside the intellectual property paradigm of the
individual seeking to exploit an idea for profit.
25
1. Copyright
Copyright protection gives the author a kind of limited monopoly right to
control and profit from the distribution of her work. Many of the most famous
Native American works of art are protected by copyright - for example the
best-selling novels of Louise Erdrich, 126 or Sherman Alexie's film Smoke
Signals.127 However, even a cursory examination of the Copyright Act of
community seeking to protect inalienable resources.
120. See generally id. Trade secrets and other intellectual property protections are not
discussed in this article, but may also supply protection. See David J. Stephenson, Jr., A
Practical Primer on Intellectual Property Rights in a Contemporary Ethnoecological Context,
in ETHNOECOLOGY: SrrUATED KNOWLEDGE/LOCATED LIVES 230,239-41 (Virginia D. Nazarea
ed., 1999) (discussing the potential utility of trade secrets to indigenous peoples).
121. Christopher C. Larkin, Traps for the Unwary: Avoiding Some Common Mistakes in
Intellectual Property Law, 27 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASs'N J. 89 (1993).
122. Riley, supra note 5, at 203; Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures:
Sacred Sites and Communal Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691, 697 (1993).
123. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
124. Riley, supra note 5, at 203; Robert Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as
Collective Group Rights, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 742 (1990).
125. See Guest, supra note 25, at 115 (stating "intellectual property rights in the United
States are driven by the economics of free enterprise and profit").
126. See, e.g., LOUISE ERDRICH, THE ANTELOPE WIFE (1998).
127. SMOKE SIGNALS (Miramax 1998). The film is based on Alexie's collection of stories.
See ALEXIE SHERMAN, THE LONE RANGER AND TONTO FISTFIGHT IN HEAVEN (1993).
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1976128 reveals it to be entirely inadequate to protect much of the Native
American linguistic and literary resource base from exploitation by outsiders.
Copyright protection extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression," including written works, visual arts, film,
music, and performance arts. 129 Much Native knowledge, because it is
embodied in oral traditions developed collectively over generations, fails to meet
all three of the central requirements of copyright law: originality, individual
authorship, and embodiment in a tangible medium.'30
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he sine qua non of copyright is
originality.... Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity."13' A
traditional song or story, while each performance may be creative, is not original
in the sense of being "independently created." Nor is it the product of an
identifiable "author"; instead, the work is typically a communal,
intergenerational collaboration. 3 ' Finally, since it exists solely as part of an oral
tradition, the work has not been reduced to a "tangible medium" and thus cannot
be copyrighted.'33
128. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (2000)).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
130. See Riley, supra note 5, at 185 (concluding that "[i]ndigenous conceptions of
[communal] ownership, rights, and values, which inhere in cultural property suggest that the
rationales which justify the current scope of copyright protection within and for the dominant
society may not be applicable or relevant in indigenous communities.").
131. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
132. WEAVER, supra note 37, at 47 ("The notion of a story with a single author, especially
one who then has a proprietary right in the act of his or her creation, would have struck pre-
Columbian Natives as absurd."); Riley, supra note 5, at 194.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Copyright law is not the only legal arena in which oral
traditions fare badly in relation to written documents. In 1976 the Mashpee Tribe brought suit
under the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, claiming its tribal land had been taken without
federal consent. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the Mashpees failed to
establish they met the definition of "tribe of Indians" under the Act, and thus lacked standing
to bring the suit. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940, 950 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1978), aft'd, Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979). Among other
problems, the Mashpees' claim to have been continually self-governing lacked documentary
evidence and relied on oral history. Some observers felt the court and jury in Mashpee Tribe
heard these oral histories merely as "gaps" in the evidentiary record. "The stories that members
of the Mashpee Tribe told were stories that legal ears could not hear. Thus the legal
requirements of relevance rendered the Indian storytellers mute and the culture they were
portraying invisible." Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent
and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuKE L.J. 625, 649 (1990). The centrality of
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2. Patent
Similar problems arise when protection for indigenous knowledge is sought
under patent law. Many traditional seeds and folk crop varieties are the result
of centuries of agricultural experimentation and experience." This knowledge
harbors enormously valuable crop genetic resources. a5 However, any attempts
to protect indigenous plant varieties for the exclusive use or profit of a tribe
under patent law again run into the individualistic and profit-oriented basis of
Western law. For one thing, persons applying to patent a plant variety must be
the breeder, inventor or original conceiver of the new plant variety. 3 6 Since
traditional knowledge develops over centuries or even millennia, generally it
will be impossible to establish any individual as the plant's originator or
"breeder." Moreover, a patent may only be awarded a plant variety that is "new"
- that is, has not been in public use in the United States for more than one
year.' Since most traditional seeds and folk varieties have been in public use
for a century or more, this novelty requirement will generally doom any attempt
to protect their use by patent.' Like copyright law, patent law is based on the
Western paradigm of the individual creative genius profiting through the public
dissemination of her creation. As such, the law applies poorly to esoteric
knowledge - the communal, cumulative knowledge embodied in oral
traditions."'
3. Trademark
The function of the trademark is "to identify and distinguish [a person's]
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
others."' O Thus IACA, as we saw, authorizes its Board to create "trademarks
of genuineness and quality" distinguishing Indian goods from cheap
the written word in the Western legal system makes it difficult for that system to acknowledge,
let alone protect, oral traditions, whether artistic or governmental.
134. Guest, supra note 25, at 122.
135. Daniela Soleri & Steven E. Smith, Conserving Folk Crop Varieties: Different
Agricultures, Different Goals, in ETHNOECOLOGY: SITUATED KNOWLEDGEILOCALLrvES, supra
note 120, at 133, 133-34.
136. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000).
137. Id. § 2402(a)(1)(A).
138. Guest, supra note 25, at 122-23.
139. Nason, supra note 36, at 259; Potts v. Coe, 140 F.2d 470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(explaining that the purpose of the plant variety protection laws is "to reward individual and not
group achievement").
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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imitations.' 4 ' As a means of protecting intangible cultural resources such as a
tribe's name and image, trademark law is limited by its commercial basis and
focus. In order to bring a trademark claim under the Lanham Act,'42 a party
must be a competitor in the market. 43 If the Cherokee tribe made sport utility
vehicles, they could sue Jeep to enjoin the use of the tribe's name" and recover
Jeep's profits and the tribe's damages for economic losses caused by that use.'45
Barring such direct commercial competition, however, and the potential
confusion of products' sources, trademark law does not give tribes or individuals
standing to contest use of tribal names.'"
To be sure, trademark law can, in some instances, provide valuable protection
for tribal symbols and even for the image of Indians in general.'47 For instance,
the Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians in Oregon has asserted
intellectual property rights in filing a lawsuit against the Indian Motorcycle
Company."' As Tribal Chair Sue Shaffer said, "We wanted people, when they
see the 'Indian' brand, to think about positive things like quality, durability and
integrity."' 149 At least one enterprising native group has even used its tribal
name, and trademarked it, to repackage stereotypes for sale as commodities such
as "Savagely Yours" ' perfume."5
141. 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(1) (2000).
142. Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000)).
143. Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189 (2nd Cir. 1980) (only
"commercial parties" have standing under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
145. Id. § 1117(a).
146. See Guest, supra note 25, at 129 (concluding that "the universal and exclusive use of
tribal names sought by Native American tribes does not appear possible.").
147. The Zia Indians of New Mexico, for instance, have sought trademark protection- and
$74 million in compensation - for their sacred sun image, which New Mexico has used on the
state flag for seventy-four years. Rebecca Lopez, Tribes Seeks Trademark Protection for Sacred
Symbols (July 9, 1999) available at www.onlineathens.com/stories/070999/new_tribe.shtml;
cf. Rick Mofina, Culture "Confiscated" for High Fashion: Inuit Women Want to Trademark
Tradition to Fend Off Fashion Industry's "Exploitation," OTrAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 16, 1999, at
Al.
148. Wayne Shammel & Dave Stephenson, Protecting American Indian Intellectual Property
in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Cow Creek Tribe and Indian Motorcycle (n.d.) (on
file with author).
149. Id.
150. See Wappo Tribal Enterprises Unlimited (n.d.) (on file with author) ("'Savagely
Yours Tm' is one of the legal trademarks of Wappo Tribal Enterprises Unlimited... celebrating
the Native American way of life."); cf. Guest, supra note 25, at 129 ("There is no question that
Native American tribes can seek federal registration of their tribal names under the Lanham Act
for goods and services they currently sell or contemplate selling in the future.").
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While such protections and opportunities may cheer the "realist" groups
seeking a fair share of the culture industry, they provide cold comfort to the
traditionalists seeking to protect certain cultural resources from
commercialization.' 5 ' Some degree of assimilation into the world market is both
inevitable and, contrary to common perceptions, consistent with many
traditional tribal cultures.'52 The question is how to accomplish this economic
participation while simultaneously retaining control over inalienable cultural
resources. To that end, intellectual property laws, including IACA, as well as
laws protecting tangible cultural resources, like ARPA and NAGPRA, may need
to be supplemented by a protective scheme more attuned to tribal oral traditions
and ceremonial wisdom. The following section surveys various potential
sources of such legal protection in both tribal law and national legislation.
IV. Communal Rights to Intangible Cultural Resources: Sources
and Prospects
It is a commonplace that Western law in general, and particularly the
discourse of property rights, derives from an individualistic - and largely
commercial - ideology.'53  This law is not monolithic, however, as it
increasingly acknowledges and incorporates Native American perspectives, nor
is it altogether hostile to communal rights. After examining tribal intellectual
property rights law, this section will discuss the validation in federal Indian law
of communal rights to cultural resources as evidenced in NAGPRA and the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
151. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between realist and
traditionalist attitudes).
152. Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country, 80 OR. L. REv. 757,780-
85 (200 1). For one expression of the widespread, somewhat Noble Savagist, belief that Indians
are not cut out for capitalism, see Karin Mika, Private Dollars on the Reservation: Will Recent
Native American Development Amount to Cultural Assimilation?, 25 N.M. L. REv. 23, 32
(1995) ("[T]he capitalistic principle of industry and commercial enterprise is arguably
incongruous with Native American culture.").
153. CAROL M. ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 105, 105-06 (1994) (outlining the familiar neoclassical economic
argument that individual property owners, because they can exclude others, will devote more
time and labor to the development of resources, to the ultimate aggregate enrichment of all);
Farley, supra note 6, at 31 ("Western notions of property, based on the premise of individual,
rather than group rights, are incompatible with indigenous customs and traditions.").
154. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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A. Tribal Control of Intangible Cultural Resources
Tribal efforts to protect indigenous cultural resources from commercial
exploitation, and from legitimate but culturally insensitive research, have been
international in scope. 5' Control over such resources is a matter not only of
property rights but of human rights. While the obligation of national
governments to protect such rights should be clear,'56 tribes in the United States
can do much themselves toward that end. Professor James D. Nason has
outlined ten issues tribal governments need to address to help ensure oversight
and control of cultural resources, including establishing research permit
procedures, specific agreements asserting tribal copyright in research data and
findings, and tribal identification of culturally sensitive data and guidelines
relating to its access. 57
Tribal definition and regulation of cultural resources is especially critical in
the control of unauthorized alienation of items by tribal members. In many
cases ownership of the resource (if any) may be unclear. For instance, in Chilkat
Indian Village v. Johnson,'8 members of the tribe sold to an art dealer posts and
a rain screen used in ceremonies by the Whale House, the Raven House and the
Valley House.'59 These individuals, as members of the Whale House, asserted
ownership of the artifacts and the exclusive right to sell them."W The tribe,
however, asserted communal ownership of these and all such artifacts, passing
a village ordinance stating "[n]o traditional Indian artifacts, clan crests, or other
Indian art works of any kind may be removed from the Chilkat Indian Village
without the prior notification of and approval by, the Chilkat Indian Village
Council..''. Various possible owners of the artifacts can be seen: the
155. See Draft Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, U.N. Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection, 43rd Sess., U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1993/29/Annex 1 (1993) [hereinafter Draft
Declaration]. Part Il, Article 12 of the Draft Declaration asserts the right of indigenous
peoples to "the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without
their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions, and customs." Id. But
see Harjo, supra note 17, at A5 (dismissing the U.N. and World Trade Organization indigenous
intellectual property pronouncements as merely "theoretical tinkering" resulting in "bad paper").
156. Draft Declaration, supra note 155, at pt. InI, art. 14 ("States shall take effective
measures, whenever any right of indigenous peoples may be threatened, to ensure this right is
protected.").
157. Nason, supra note 36, at 262.
158. 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).
159. id. at 1471.
160. Id. at 1471 n.4.
161. Id. at 1472. The Chilkat court did not reach the issue of ownership, deciding the case
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individuals, the Whale House as a whole, the Ganaxtedi Clan to which the
House belongs, and the village or tribe. Such complexity of interests in
ceremonial art or songs is common within tribal societies, where individual
identities and rights typically arise within a network of family, kinship and clan
relationships. '62 Tribal members, who best understand these relationships, must
be the ones to define which resources may be individually owned and alienated,
and which are inalienable.
Whether the issue is resolved by a flat ban on export, as the Chilkat Village
ordinance mandated, 163 or a more protracted and nuanced proceeding of the kind
contemplated by Nason, tribes must take this necessary first step before any
external legal protection will be meaningful. As tribes concurrently undertake
this process of defining and controlling communal resources, Nason suggests,
a consensus may emerge on what type of federal legislation, if any, is needed to
provide additional protection."6 Such legislation would need to abandon the
individualistic and commercial orientation of the Western legal tradition 65 and
embrace communal rights.
B. Recognition of Communal Rights to Cultural Resources in Existing
Federal Law
Some critics of Western law see little to suggest it can accommodate
community-based rights, arguing that "the existing legal structure focuses
almost entirely on the individual, and does not concede value inherent in groups
per se."' 66 However, U.S. law is not as monolithic as such arguments would
suggest. In fact, laws relating to Indian cultural preservation explicitly do
recognize the value inherent in groups per se, particularly tribes. A brief survey
of these laws, focusing on their recognition of communal rights, suggests that
the possible legal recognition and protection of communal resources like stories
and ceremonies has substantial legal precedent.
on jurisdictional grounds, but for purposes of this case "accept[ed] as true... that the tribe has
a paramount proprietary interest in the artifacts." Id. at 1472 n. 4.
162. Robert Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 ARIZ.
L. REv. 739, 742 (1990).
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. Nason, supra note 36, at 263.
165. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; Herz, supra note 122, at 697.
166. Riley, supra note 5, at 203. Even Riley, however, finds authority for such rights in
federal Indian law, as will be discussed below in Part IV.B.3.
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1. The Indian Child Welfare Act
In response to abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation
of huge numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through state
court adoption and foster care placements, Congress enacted the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). 6 7 ICWA seeks to ensure "the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture," in order to stem the flow of Indian children to non-Indian
families.'68 The Act grants exclusive tribal jurisdiction (and preferred
concurrent jurisdiction) over the placement of Indian children domiciled on
reservations, 169 and establishes a placement preference hierarchy in which
extended family members get priority, followed by other members of the tribe,
followed by other Indian families. 7 Disputes over placement and custody are
resolved by the tribal agency or court.'7 '
Having found "there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,"'7 Congress in
ICWA created a communal right in that "resource" held by the tribe. ICWA, in
fact, curtails the individual freedom of the child's parents to contract for
adoption with whomever they see fit, for the sake of the long-term survival of
the community. 73 A culture largely embodied in oral traditions is potentially
only one generation away from extinction. As one tribal leader testified in a
hearing on the bill that would become ICWA, "[c]ulturally, the chances of
Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the only real means for
the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and
denied exposure to the ways of their People."'' 74
A kind of Endangered Cultures Act, ICWA explicitly creates a category of
inalienable cultural resources: children. Viewing children in this way may pose
167. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
168. Id. § 1902.
169. Id. § 1911(a).
170. Id. § 1915(a).
171. Id. § 1915(c).
172. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
173. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 65 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (holding that Indian parents domiciled on a reservation cannot voluntarily avail
themselves of state court adoption procedures).
174. Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978) (testimony of Calvin
Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians).
[Vol. 28
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/8
SPECIAL FEATURES
the risk of commodification and dehumanization. 175 Ironically, though, it also
establishes a legal precedent in federal law for granting and protecting the kind
of communal rights that could prevent commodification by outsiders of
inalienable resources like sacred songs, stories and ceremonies.
2. NAGPRA
The goal of NAGPRA, as discussed earlier,'76 is to provide a legal
mechanism for the repatriation of human remains and certain categories of tribal
artifacts. The Act vests ownership of such items in the tribe on whose land they
were found, or with whom the items are culturally affiliated.' Most pertinent
to this discussion is NAGPRA's definition of "cultural patrimony" as property
which, due to its central cultural importance, is owned by the group and not any
individual. 7 8 Cultural patrimony is, by definition, "inalienable," so it cannot be
conveyed by any individual, even a tribal member. 7 9 The determination of
which property is inalienable cultural patrimony is made by the tribe. 80
Therefore ordinances such as the Chilkat Village' s,18 restricting alienation of
cultural patrimony by individuals, should be enforceable as a matter of federal
as well as tribal law.
Like ICWA, NAGPRA recognizes "the unique values of Indian culture" and
seeks to protect them by limiting individual rights of alienation in favor of
communal rights of possession and use."' While these acts are of relatively
recent vintage, their accommodation of Indian culture through acknowledging
a group-rights model of ownership was really prefigured in federal Indian law
in general.
3. Communal Rights in Federal Indian Law
Angela R. Riley has offered a detailed argument for federal recognition of
communal rights based in federal Indian law.'83 She first notes that the Indian
Commerce Clause recognizes Indian Nations as distinct quasi-sovereign
peoples, and empowers Congress to regulate trade not with individual Indians,
175. See supra Part H.C.
176. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
177. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(A)-(C) (2000).
178. Id. § 3001(3)(D); see also supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
182. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000).
183. Riley, supra note 5, at 205-14.
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but with Indian Nations."4 The federal trust responsibility which has evolved
from two centuries of interpretation of, and enactments under, the Indian
Commerce Clause 185 also emphasizes the group rights of tribes. 186 For instance,
much tribal land is held in trust for tribes by the federal government and cannot
be alienated by the tribe or any member of it.187 As the Court of Claims noted
in 1893, "[t]he distinctive characteristic of [tribal] communal property is that
every member of the community.., has a right of property in the lands as
perfect as that of any other person; and his children after him will enjoy all that
he enjoyed, not as heirs but as communal owners."'' 88
Federal Indian law, then, recognizes group rights to property and other
resources, particularly in the context of the cultural survival of Indian tribes, as
seen with NAGPRA and ICWA. The plenary power of Congress under the
Indian Commerce Clause gives it authority to deal with tribal groups. Thus it
should also authorize Congress to protect group intellectual property rights of
Indians as well. The question to be considered in the following section is
whether Congress should do so.
V. Freezing Tradition: The Dangers of Protecting Culture Through Legal
Rights
A number of commentators have touted group rights as the key to legal
recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous peoples, as well as to
legal protection of tribal cultural resources. 189 Riley, for example, has proposed
an "Indian Copyright Act" that would be flexible enough to protect stories and
songs in oral traditions, works with collective, cumulative authorship in
184. Id. at 205.
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
17 (1831) (tribe's relationship to the United States is like that of "a ward to its guardian").
186. Riley, supra note 5, at 207; Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of
Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1498-99.
187. Riley, supra note 5, at 209.
188. Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing
Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
437,442 (1986) (citing Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281 (1893), affid, 155 U.S.
196 (1894)).
189. See, e.g., John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict
Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179 (1990); Herz, supra note 122; Riley, supra note 5;
David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property Law and
Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can It Fit?, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 93 (2000-
2001).
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intangible media."9  Under this proposed Act, the strict definitions of
"originality," "authorship" and "fixation" in current copyright law would not
apply. Thus, ownership of the intangible property would remain with the tribe
forever, inalienable by individual members.' 9' Disputes over what is
"collective" and what is individual would be left to the tribes to settle, much like
custody disputes under ICWA. 1
92
There is much to commend such proposals. As shown earlier, current laws
protect tangible artifacts adequately but not intangible cultural resources.
Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, a substantial legal basis exists
in federal law for the recognition of rights in communal "property" such as
stories and songs. Dangers lurk, however, in subjecting cultural resources to an
intellectual property rights regime, even communal rights free from the Western
individualistic and commercial biases. Property tends to become commodified,
and to that extent drained of meaning. ' Rather than impose a uniform federal
law that may, like IACA, prove ineffective and do more harm than good,'94 the
wisest course of action at this time is to encourage the tribes themselves to
develop policies and procedures regarding access to cultural resources.195
A. Protection as Ossification: The Danger of Stifling Innovation
Imposing intellectual property protections - even protections under an
innovative communal rights regime - on stories, songs, and ceremonies creates
the danger of preserving a static "culture" at the expense of a living one. Native
artists who wish to use tradition in innovative ways, to build on it and infuse it
with other cultural influences, may be prevented or discouraged from doing
so.' 96 Legal overprotection of cultural resources "may 'freeze' the culture in a
historic moment, allowing us to think of indigenous people as romantic relics
from a lost time, and to deny them a contemporary voice."' 97 While Native
American cultures have always valued tradition, they have never been static;
oral traditions, not being fixed in writing, continually evolve through innovative
190. Riley, supra note 5, at 214-18.
191. Id. at 217.
192. Id.; supra note 171 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part II.C.
194. See Hapiuk, supra note 109, at 1031, 1067 (criticizing IACA's definition of "Indian"
and calling for the repeal of IACA's civil cause of action and criminal provisions); SHEFFIELD,
supra note 101, at 10 (suggesting IACA "may well be struck down as unconstitutional").
195. Nason, supra note 36, at 262-63.
196. Farley, supra note 6, at 55.
197. Id.
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performance.'98 As the Acoma poet Simon Ortiz has said, the oral tradition is
not just speaking and listening, but "living that process" of cultural
development. 199
That development has included centuries of contact, conflict and trade with
Euro-American cultures. It is safe to say that Native artists draw from a variety
of traditions, not just a single tribal (let alone "Indian") essence.2" Anishinaabe
writer and critic Gerald Vizenor refers to contemporary Indian artists as
"postindian warriors of survivance" who draw on tribal traditions but also on
"the ruins of the representations of invented Indians." '' Vizenor's own novels
draw on Anishinaabe (Ojibwe) oral traditions, such as the Earthdiver creation
story and trickster tales, while employing techniques and tropes of
postmodemism as well.2 °2 To compartmentalize one segment of a people's
cultural resources as communal property and thus unavailable for artistic - or
commercial - appropriation would require the utmost delicacy. Therefore, it
should not be undertaken with the blunt instrument of a uniform federal law,
even one that leaves definition of the resource base to the tribes.203 Tribal laws
and practices will provide more sensitive and specific resource access
regimes.24 Only if and when a consensus emerges among the tribes that federal
legislation - an intellectual property version of NAGPRA, perhaps - is
needed, should such an avenue be pursued. °5
198. Ortiz, supra note 35, at 105; Swann, supra note 40, at xxiv; WEAVER, supra note 37,
at 23-24.
199. Ortiz, supra note 35, at 104.
200. Weaver, supra note 37, at 29-30; Hapiuk, supra note 109, at 1054. Again, the fact that
Native artists have become so adept at appropriating alien forms and themes makes IACA's
attempt to guarantee "genuineness" quite problematic. See supra notes 107-17 and
accompanying text.
201. Gerald Vizenor, Postindian Warriors, in MANIFEST MANNERS: POSTINDIAN WARRIORS
OF SURVIVANCE 3 (1994).
202. Stephen D. Osborne, Legal and Tribal Identity in Gerald Vizenor's The Heirs of
Columbus, 9 STUDIES IN AM. INDIAN LITERATURES 115, 119 (1997).
203. Commentators sometimes assume that, due to the communal orientation of tribes,
individual artists would gladly consent to a communal intellectual property rights regime in
which, for instance, artistic creations would be held by the tribe in shared ownership with the
artist, or the property right in the work would escheat to the tribe upon the death of the artist.
See Jordan, supra note 189, at 114 (advocating federal legislation providing for such communal
rights). I doubt this assumption is well grounded. Even if it is, the communal property rights
should be created pursuant to tribal law, so there is some chance of tailoring the legal regime
to particular tribal traditions and contemporary circumstances, rather than imposing federal
legislation uniformly on all tribes.
204. Nason, supra note 36, at 262; Farley, supra note 6, at 56 n.235.
205. Nason, supra note 36, at 263.
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B. Commodification of Cultural Resources
A related reason for caution in pursuing such resource protection legislation
may be found in the tendency of legal rights to become propertized, then
commodified. The damage this can do, while difficult to quantify, may be
pernicious nonetheless. Both ICWA and IACA illustrate this process, which
underlies some of the problems those statutes pose."
We saw that IACA, by privileging "genuineness" and linking it to a particular
definition of "Indian," creates what some commentators see as a property
interest in being Indian. °7 If Indianness is to be protected by intellectual
property law, it must be identifiable and fixed, so that it can be "owned" by the
holder. 0 8 Separated from both the individual subject and any specific tribal
meaning, "Indianness" becomes an external object with a life and value of its
own - in short, a commodity. Thus identity can be licensed and marketed -
recall "Savagely Yours" ' perfume - producing revenue but diluting or
distorting meaning.
Similarly, ICWA defines Indian children as a cultural "resource," 2" and
creates a kind of communal property right in that resource.2"0 To the extent that
such a characterization becomes more than a mere figure of speech, children
have become means to an end - cultural survival - rather than ends in
themselves, tools or instruments rather than humans. Margaret Radin has
presented a powerful argument that such rhetoric can and does, over time,
influence the way we conceptualize the world, and ultimately act in the world.21'
If this is so, figuring children and Indianness as properties should be worrisome.
Perhaps cultural survival is such a paramount concern that the dangers of
commodification of children and identity are worth risking. This, too, is for the
peoples themselves to decide; the purpose here is merely to articulate the risk.
VI. Conclusion
Appropriation and misuse of intangible cultural resources is a real problem
for indigenous communities. Due to the nature of oral traditions, intellectual
206. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
207. Sheffield, supra note 101, at 138; Shammel & Stephenson, supra note 148, at 3.
208. Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1866-67 (1991).
209. 25 U.S.C. 1901(3).
210. See supra notes 172, 173 and accompanying text.
211. Margaret Jane Radin, Human Flourishing and Market Rhetoric, in CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 79-102 (1996).
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property laws based on Western law's traditional concern with individual rights
and profit orientation fail to protect many Native works. Cultural resource laws
such as NAGPRA and ICWA acknowledge communal rights for tribal peoples,
but their focus on tangible resources (artifacts and children, respectively) leaves
stories, songs and ceremonies unprotected. Lawyers and legal scholars, quite
naturally, have sought the solution to this problem in more and better laws. It
is tempting to employ intellectual property law, progressively reconfigured to
accommodate the communal nature of oral traditions and communities, to fill
this gap. This article argues, however, that the dangers of propertizing such
cultural resources make such a strategy unwise. Employing intellectual property
law to prevent appropriation and commodification by outsiders could, ironically,
end up freezing cultures into static commodities. This paradox requires
confronting the limits of what law can accomplish. Preserving meaning - as
opposed to objects - sometimes lies beyond those limits.
Protection of cultural property is, of course, essential.212 But not all elements
of a culture can be protected as property. When the cultural resource is
intangible, evolving, growing like a living oral tradition and culture, its meaning
must not be fixed and confined by some reified notion of "genuineness," nor
reduced to a static commodity. Its protection should be in the hands of the group
that produced it and understands it.213 This protection will probably consist not
in locking songs and stories in the strongbox of "genuine tradition," but in their
creative application of core cultural insights to solving the problems presented
by evolving historical contexts.
212. As Sherry Hutt and Timothy McKeown have eloquently stated, "The preservation of
cultural property rights is essential to give meaning to human existence and as a bond against
enslaving a people by diminishing the definition of their existence." Hutt & McKeown, supra
note 90, at 364.
213. See Harjo, supra note 17, at A5 (advocating that Native peoples "avoid adopting the
term intellectual property and its mechanisms altogether," and instead inventory and declare
paramount rights to inalienable cultural resources, and undertake treaties with the federal
government and other tribes for protection of those resources); Nason, supra note 36, at 262
(proposing ten steps tribal governments can take to assert control over intangible cultural
resources).
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